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 The Real Trouble with Armchair 
Arguments against Phenomenal 
Externalism 
 Adam  Pautz 
 The  intrinsicness of  phenomenology is  self-evident to reflective 
introspection. 
 —Terry Horgan and John Tienson 
 Every argument has its intuitive bedrock. 
 —John Hawthorne 
 According to  reductive externalist theories of phenomenal consciousness, 
the sensible qualities (colours, sounds, tastes, smells) reduce to physical 
properties out there in the external environment, contrary to the seven-
teenth-century Galilean view that they are somehow only in the mind-
brain. Further, if we are to be conscious of these external qualities, we 
must be appropriately physically connected to them (e.g., our sensory 
systems must causally detect or ‘track’ them). This leads to  phenomenal 
externalism : intrinsically identical subjects can differ phenomenally 
due to external differences. Examples of reductive externalism include 
‘tracking intentionalism’ (Dretske, Lycan, Tye), active externalism (Noë 
and O’Regan) and reductive versions of naive realism (Fish). Many think 
such externalist theories represent our best shot at reductively explaining 
phenomenal consciousness. 1 
 The standard arguments against such theories invoke armchair intui-
tions about far-out cases such as brains in vats, swampmen and inverts 
(Block, Chalmers, Hawthorne, Levine, Shoemaker). They often presup-
pose  phenomenal  internalism : phenomenology supervenes on intrinsic 
character. They play a crucial role in the burgeoning  phenomenal  inten-
tionality program (Horgan, Tienson, Kriegel). A central plank in this 
program is that reductive externalism fails because armchair reflection 
establishes phenomenal internalism. Indeed, phenomenal intentionality 
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theorists not only reject reductive externalist theories; they often reject 
all reductive approaches, adopting instead what I call a  consciousness 
first approach: phenomenal consciousness is not something that must 
be reductively explained in other terms (e.g., tracking plus cognitive/
rational accessibility) but rather a starting point from which to explain 
other things (e.g., cognition, rationality, value). 
 My sympathies lie with phenomenal internalism and the phenom-
enal intentionality program. 2 In particular, I defend an internalist, neo-
Galilean (or ‘Edenic’) version of ‘intentionalism’ (Pautz 2006; Chalmers 
2006). But here my aim is negative. I criticize  three main armchair 
arguments against rival reductive externalist theories. Externalists like 
Dretske, Lycan and Tye have raised their own objections to such argu-
ments. But I show that they do not quite hit the nail on the head; I iden-
tify what I take to be the real problems, arguing that the much-discussed 
armchair arguments are in fact without merit. The moral: the case for 
phenomenal internalism must depend on  empirical arguments. 
 1  Preliminary: why take phenomenal 
externalism seriously? 
 Before considering arguments against reductive externalist theories of 
consciousness, I want to briefly explain why such theories should be 
taken seriously in the first place. I develop what I consider the best argu-
ment. On the face of it, the best explanation for the perception of spatial 
features invokes interactions with things in external space. 
 Consider an example, which I use throughout this chapter. Let  R 
be the phenomenal property you have when you view a tomato on a 
certain occasion.  R is essentially  externally directed ; it necessarily exhibits 
a  rich spatial  intentionality . Necessarily, if you have  R , then – even if you 
are hallucinating – you ostensibly experience phenomenal redness and 
roundness as bound together at a certain viewer-relative place. So you 
are in a state that ‘matches the world’ only if a round object is present 
there. Call this  the spatial datum about  R . 
 Now, against nominalism, I assume the existence of  properties . Then 
the spatial datum implies that having  R entails bearing a certain  relation 
to the spatial property  being round : roughly, the relation  x is in a state 
that matches the  world only if property y is instantiated . Call this relation 
the  phenomenal representation relation . So if you have  R while halluci-
nating, then the general  property of being round exists, and you bear 
the phenomenal representation relation to it, even if you do not see an 
existing  object that instantiates this property. 
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 In my view, the best argument for externalist theories of phenomenal 
consciousness is that they might provide the  best explanation of spatial 
experiential intentionality. I focus throughout this essay on  tracking 
 intentionalism (Dretske, Tye, others). 
 Tracking intentionalists accept  strong  intentionalism : phenomenology 
is  fully constituted by the phenomenal representation of complexes of 
properties. Then they explain phenomenal representation in two steps. 
First, against internalists who often locate the sensible qualities in the 
brain (and so have trouble explaining the spatial datum), they main-
tain that sensible properties are  really instantiated in external space . For 
instance, the apparent redness of the tomato (redness-as-we-see-it) is a 
‘light-reflectance property’ of the tomato’s surface. Second, you repre-
sent such properties because under optimal conditions your neural states 
suitably causally co-vary with (‘track’) their external instantiation and in 
turn lead to appropriate behaviour in space (e.g., behaviour appropriate 
to a  round thing at p ). For instance, in having  R , you represent a certain 
phenomenal colour and shape as co-instantiated out there in space, by 
virtue of the fact that your neural state has the function of normally 
tracking their co-instantiation in space. You can represent these proper-
ties while hallucinating, because your brain state retains the function 
of tracking them. So the phenomenal representation relation  just is a 
tracking relation – a kind of thermometer model of consciousness. How 
 else might we explain the representation of qualities in space? 3 
 The basic idea comes in different versions. Dretske (1995) reduces 
the phenomenal representation relation to this relation:  x is in a state 
that satisfies a certain cognitive-rational access condition and that has 
the systemic biological function of tracking property  y . The relevant 
cognitive access condition is what is supposed to turn mere subpersonal 
representation into genuine conscious, ‘phenomenal’ representation (it 
will not play a role here). The relevant notion of biological function is 
explained in historical-evolutionary terms (more on this in Section 6). 
Recently, Tye (2012) converted to a similar historical theory. 
 Tracking intentionalism is externalist. Phenomenology isn’t fixed 
by subjects’ intrinsic properties but by what external properties their 
sensory systems track. To illustrate, consider an  accidental, lone, lifelong 
brain in a vat ( a  bad-off  BIV ) that is an intrinsic duplicate of your brain as 
you see a tomato. It lacks an evolutionary history. Its brain states, unlike 
your brain states,  lack the function of tracking any external shapes (etc.) 
in any population. So on tracking intentionalism, it cannot represent 
 roundness . But given the spatial datum,  R is inseparable from repre-
senting roundness. So it cannot have  R . 
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 Tracking intentionalism is also reductive. Reduction is attractive. 
Everyone accepts the following  dependence claim: total (narrow and wide) 
physical duplicates must (as a  matter of at least  nomological necessity) bear 
the phenomenal representation relation to all of the same properties (shapes, 
orientations, phenomenal colours) . Because it is reductive, tracking inten-
tionalism nicely  explains this as follows: (i)  total physical duplicates trivi-
ally bear the  tracking relation to the same properties (since it is a physical 
relation), and (ii) the phenomenal representation relation  just is the 
tracking relation. This explanation for phenomenal-physical depend-
ence bottoms out in a phenomenal-physical  identity (‘real definition’). 
This is appealing, because identities do not ‘cry out for’ further expla-
nation. Indeed, identities are  explanation stoppers : they don’t admit of 
further explanation. What would it be to explain any identity? 
 Turn now to  phenomenal  internalism . I favour it in the end, but I 
admit it faces puzzles. For one thing, I think it requires a radically  non-
reductive account of experiential intentionality. Phenomenal internal-
ists (including phenomenal intentionalists such as Horgan and Tienson) 
have overlooked the point. True, some phenomenal internalists (Block, 
Kriegel, McLaughlin, Prinz) incline towards reductive type-type neural 
identity theory, holding that monadic phenomenal properties such as  R 
are identical with monadic internal neurofunctional properties. 4 But as 
Field (2001, 69–72) has argued, philosophers cannot rest content with 
reducing  monadic mental properties to  monadic neural or functional 
properties: they must also say something about  dyadic mental  relations 
between subjects and external items, such as the phenomenal represen-
tation relation. Tracking intentionalists reduce it to an externally deter-
mined  tracking relation . Can phenomenal internalists reduce it? 
 The following argument (Pautz 2010b , §7; Tye [forthcoming a]) 
suggests not: phenomenal internalists (even if they accept type-type 
identity for  monadic phenomenal properties) must accept primitivism 
about the  dyadic phenomenal representation relation :
 Given phenomenal internalism, the aforementioned bad-off BIV  1. does 
have tomato-like experience  R . 
 Having  2. R is inseparable from having an experience of a  round thing, 
an experience that ‘matches the world’ only if something is present 
that is  round . (Spatial datum.) 
 So in having  3. R , the BIV bears the dyadic phenomenal representation 
relation to the property  being round – even if  R is intrinsic, it entails 
standing in this relation to a particular shape (Horgan et al. 2004, 
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304–305). (As we saw, this follows from the spatial datum and the 
existence of properties.) 
 But,  4. ex  hypothesi , the BIV bears no  dyadic  physical-functional (e.g., 
 tracking ) relation to this property. 
 5. Conclusion : phenomenal internalism implies that the phenomenal 
representation relation is a  non-physical and (presumably)  primi-
tive relation between individuals and  being round and other sensible 
properties. 
 I think this argument is a threat to reductive materialism no less serious 
than the standard ‘explanatory gap’ arguments. 
 The case for premise 4 is simply that, while the BIV is conscious of 
roundness and other properties, it bears no actual or dispositional  phys-
ical relations uniquely to those properties. 5 So phenomenal internalists 
must apparently say that the phenomenal representation relation is a 
non-physical relation. Phenomenal internalism goes naturally with  non-
reductive,  internalist  intentionalism (Chalmers 2006; Pautz 2006) in direct 
opposition to tracking intentionalism. 
 Some phenomenal internalists object to the move from premise 2 
to 3. For instance, since they reject abstract objects, Kriegel (2011) and 
Mendelovici (2010) deny that having  R essentially involves standing 
in any real  relation to the general property,  roundness , understood as a 
necessarily existing abstract object. If there is no such relation, internal-
ists don’t have to worry about reducing it. My reply is that the argument 
doesn’t require that  R is  essentially relational. 6 For even if  R is not  essen-
tially relational, having  R certainly at least  contingently implies standing 
in certain mental relations to properties (or tropes) and concrete types 
of things  in scenarios where those properties and types exist . For instance, 
suppose that in the BIV scenario there happens to be a round tomato 
in front of the BIV as it undergoes its tomato-like hallucination. Then, 
even if the property of being round exists only in scenarios where it 
is instantiated (an ‘immanent’ conception of properties), the property 
 being round exists in the scenario, and in having  R , the BIV stands in 
the phenomenal representation relation to it. Further, the BIV bears the 
following relation to the concrete tomato that exists in the scenario  x 
has an  experience that is accurate with respect to y . Since the BIV bears no 
physical-functional relations to such things, phenomenal internalism 
apparently entails that these mind-world relations are primitive. 7 
 The main drawback of primitivism is that it cannot provide any very 
appealing explanation of the aforementioned dependence claim:  total 
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(narrow and wide) physical duplicates bear the phenomenal representation 
relation to all of the same properties (shapes, orientations, colours) and types 
of concrete things . 
 One option for internalist primitivists is a  dualist explanation : there 
is a swarm of basic, contingent  phenomenal-physical laws linking being 
in certain physical states (e.g., neural states) with bearing the primitive 
phenomenal representation relation to certain shapes, phenomenal 
colours, positions and so on. They would be ‘nomological danglers’, 
additional to the basic laws of physics. This is unappealing. The tracking 
intentionalist’s explanation bottoms out an identity, which is an ‘expla-
nation stopper’. By contrast, the dualist’s laws cry out for further expla-
nation.  Why do these laws obtain? We must admit  some such basic modal 
truths, but we should keep them to a minimum. 
 Another option for internalist primitivists would be an  emergent mate-
rialist explanation of phenomenal-physical dependence (Rosen 2010, 
132). I argued that internalism implies that the phenomenal represen-
tation relation is  primitive and  distinct from the physical,  in the sense 
that there is no reduction (real definition, metaphysical analysis) of it in 
physical-functional terms (no general completion of schema  what it is 
for x to stand in the phenomenal representation relation to y just is for x to bear 
 physical-functional relation R to y ).  Emergent materialists nevertheless claim 
that this primitive relation is always  grounded in (instantiated  by virtue 
of ) the physical and hence depends on the physical with  metaphysical 
necessity . (Grounding has received a great deal of contemporary interest; 
see Rosen 2010.) The only difference with dualism is modal: on dualism, 
the dependence is  contingent . So on emergent materialism, there is a 
huge swarm of  phenomenal-physical  ‘grounding laws’ of this form: being 
in internal neural state  N grounds bearing the primitive phenomenal 
representation relation to  X . All these phenomenal-physical grounding 
laws are basic. I don’t just mean that they are deeply a posteriori rather 
than a priori (most materialists would not object to a posteriori neces-
sities). I mean they are  metaphysically basic ‘grounding danglers’: they 
don’t follow from any more basic truths. Emergent materialism, then, is 
analogous to a Moorean metaethical view on which  goodness is  primitive 
but always  grounded in natural properties. 
 The innumerable grounding danglers of emergent materialism are just 
as unappealing as the nomological danglers of dualism. They cry out for 
explanation. If the phenomenal representation relation is  distinct from 
all physical-functional relations,  why is it  necessarily connected with 
(and grounded in) the physical-functional facts? (Analogy: if an emer-
gentist said that we are simple souls yet somehow necessarily grounded 
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in wholly distinct bodies, we would be mystified.) Just as many used to 
say ‘supervenience’ cries out for explanation, I suggest grounding – its 
contemporary replacement – cries out for explanation as well. Reductive 
explanations are better. 
 We phenomenal internalists face another problem. It appears totally 
 arbitrary that a mere pattern of neural firing  B should result in the 
phenomenal representation of  roundness rather than some other shape, 
even in the BIV scenario in which it is not causally linked to any shape at 
all. (Also, why should it result in the experience of phenomenal redness 
 at this particular position in the visual field?) Phenomenal externalists, 
such as tracking intentionalists, might avoid this arbitrariness (even if 
they cannot avoid the explanatory gap). On their externalist view, the 
physical ground of phenomenally representing  roundness is not the mere 
neural state  B but a wider, environment-involving state that is specified 
in terms of that very spatial property: the state of having some internal 
state or other that has the function of tracking  roundness and causing 
behaviour appropriate to  round things. 
 So phenomenal externalists  might nicely explain the spatial inten-
tionality of perceptual experience. By contrast, those of us favouring 
phenomenal internalism must grapple with some serious puzzles. 
Therefore our topic is important: can simple armchair arguments under-
mine reductive externalism and establish phenomenal internalism? My 
answer is no. 
 2  The argument from the internalist intuition 
 Many philosophers (Block, Chalmers, Burge, Hawthorne, Kriegel, Levine 
and Speaks) espouse the first argument I examine against reductive 
externalist theories. It has two steps. 
 Roughly, an  intrinsic property of an individual is one whose instantia-
tion by that individual does not constitutively depend on contingent 
items wholly distinct from that individual. We have empirically defea-
sible, pre-theoretical justification for believing  some properties to be 
intrinsic. Consider, for instance,  shapes . The first step of the argument 
claims that we likewise have a strong pre-theoretical justification for 
believing that  phenomenal properties such as  R and  having a headache are 
intrinsic properties of  subjects , so that 
 Phenomenal  internalism : all experiences supervene on subjects’ 
intrinsic properties; total intrinsic duplicates of you must (as a matter 
of  metaphysical necessity) be phenomenal duplicates of you. 
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 This is the  internalist intuition . Hawthorne (2004, 352) calls it  intuitive 
bedrock , and Horgan and Tienson (2002, n. 23) call a similar claim ‘self-
evident’. 8 How could individuals differ concerning whether they have a 
headache or see red, unless they differ intrinsically?  9 
 The second step uses thought experiments to show that certain reduc-
tive theories of consciousness violate phenomenal internalism. Consider 
again ‘tracking intentionalism’ (Section 1). 
1.  The  bad-off  BIV : We already saw that tracking intentionalism entails 
that the bad-off BIV cannot support phenomenal consciousness. This 
violates phenomenal internalism, since it is an intrinsic duplicate of 
your brain. 
2.  Swampman : Harold is an ordinary person. A total intrinsic dupli-
cate of Harold materializes by chance in a swamp. This system,  Swamp 
 Harold , has no evolutionary history. As noted in Section 1, Dretske’s 
and Tye’s versions of tracking intentionalism entail that only systems 
with a selection history can represent the world. Since standard forms 
of phenomenology are inseparable from intentionality (e.g., standard 
visual experiences necessarily exhibit spatial intentionality), it follows 
that although Harold and Swamp Harold are total intrinsic duplicates, 
they differ phenomenally: in particular, Swamp Harold simply has no 
interesting experiences at all, contrary to phenomenal internalism. 
3.  Inverted  Earth : On Earth, the sky is blue. When Harold looks at it, 
he gets receptor activity  A on his retina and downstream neural state 
 S . On Earth, among humans,  S has the biological function of tracking 
external blueness. 
 Suppose that, on Inverted Earth, there evolved a species intrinsically 
identical to Homo sapiens. But objects there have inverted colours; for 
instance, the sky is yellow rather than blue. However, the ambient light 
is weird and has always been weird throughout the evolutionary process, 
so that yellow objects give off ‘blue’ light. So when Twin Harold looks 
at the  yellow sky on inverted earth, he gets receptor activity  A on his 
retina and downstream neural state  S , the same neural state Harold gets 
when he looks at the  blue sky on earth. (In another version of the case, 
twin humans naturally evolved with colour-inverting lenses in front of 
their eyes, so that yellow light is transformed into blue light.) Indeed, on 
viewing the sky, Twin Harold is a complete intrinsic duplicate of Harold 
on earth. But whereas in Harold  S has the biological function of tracking 
 surface blue , in Twin Harold it has the biological function of tracking 
 surface yellow . 10 
 On tracking intentionalism, this means that even though Harold and 
Twin Harold occupy the same total internal state, this internal state 
The Real Trouble with Armchair Arguments 161
enables them to phenomenally represent different external colours. 
Again, tracking intentionalism violates the internalist intuition. 
 3  Problem: no armchair support for phenomenal 
internalism 
 I think that the argument from the internalist intuition is a non-
starter. However, before explaining why, I criticize standard externalist 
objections. 
 Externalists have been concessive. Dretske (1995, 151) concedes that 
phenomenal internalism seems ‘obvious’ and ‘powerful’. Tye (2000, 
120) admits that rejecting phenomenal internalism is ‘deeply counterin-
tuitive’. Their objections lie elsewhere. But I think armchair enthusiasts 
might offer somewhat convincing replies to those objections. 
 Dretske’s main objection involves a  1. rebutting defeater (1995, 151). 
Apparently, the best reductive materialist theories of consciousness and 
its intentionality violate phenomenal internalism, as I admitted myself 
(Section 1). So there is a strong theoretical argument against it. Maybe 
this beats the intuitive argument for it. 
 Possible reply: Maybe phenomenal internalism is compatible with 
reductive materialism after all; maybe my Section 1 argument fails. If 
not, perhaps the internalist intuition is so compelling that we must 
accept it despite its problematic consequences. 
 Dretske (1995, 148) and Tye (2012) produce  2. undercutting defeaters . 
Offhand, you might have thought that every intrinsic duplicate of 
a heart is a heart or that every intrinsic duplicate of a gas gauge is a 
gas gauge. These intuitions are wrong, because the relevant properties 
depend on historical, extrinsic factors. Given the bad track record of 
internalist intuitions, maybe we are equally wrong about the intrinsic-
ness of phenomenal character. 
 Possible Reply: Even if our initial, unreflective  opinions about the intrin-
sicness of some quite different properties are wrong (as we see ourselves 
realize after a moment’s thought), this provides little reason to doubt our 
persisting  intuition about the intrinsicness of  phenomenal character . 
 Lycan (2001, 24) says using the internalist intuition ‘simply begs 3. 
the question of [phenomenal] externalism in favor of internalism’. 
 Possible reply: Hawthorne (2004, n. 4) notes that this is a confused use 
of ‘begging the question’: it is not question begging to use  pre-theoretical 
intuitions against a theory just because they conflict with that theory. 
 So I think externalists’ objections to the argument from the internalist 
intuition fail. What then is the real problem? 
162 Adam Pautz
 Externalists like Tye and Dretske have been much too concessive in 
granting that phenomenal internalism enjoys pre-theoretical support at 
all. The real problem is that this is not so. A little reflection, indeed the 
whole history of human thought on perception, shows that phenom-
enal externalism is not absurd at all; indeed, if anything, it is pre-theo-
retically quite plausible. 
 For instance, many have accepted  naive realism . On this view, the 
sensible qualities, or ‘qualia’, are really out in the world: colours, sound 
qualities, tastes and so on. For instance, when you view a tomato and 
have phenomenal property  R , the red quality you are directly acquainted 
with is really ‘spread out’ on its surface. The distinctive claim of naive 
realism is that, at least in ‘veridical’ cases,  some ordinary (non-burry, etc.) 
phenomenal properties such as  R are grounded in nothing but standing 
in a relation of direct acquaintance to a concrete state, or condition, 
involving the instantiation of sensible properties (colours, shapes) by 
a mind-independent physical object. (These sensible properties include 
viewpoint-relative properties such as  being elliptical from here – ‘objective 
looks’.) 
 To handle hallucination, naive realists might appeal to non-normal 
objects such as sense data or Meinongian objects, so that  R is always 
grounded in acquaintance with objects. Alternatively, they might accept 
a more extreme ‘disjunctivism’ (I think the best version is ‘primitivist 
disjunctivism’, discussed in Pautz 2010a, 275). So hallucination doesn’t 
undermine naive realism. 
 Naive realism is an example of a  relational ( act-object) theory of  phenom-
enology :  some phenomenal properties are, in some cases, grounded in 
direct acquaintance with concrete objects and states wholly distinct 
from perceivers. 
 Naive realists have taken different views on the physical basis of 
acquaintance with the world. Pre-modern thinkers such as Plato, Euclid 
and Ptolemy accepted the  extromission theory : we become acquainted 
with the world by way of rays  emanating from the eye (perhaps with 
infinite velocity, like gravity in Newton’s theory). Thus in his  Optika 
Euclid wrote:
 Rays [proceed] from the eye [and] those things are seen upon which 
the visual rays fall and those things are not seen upon which the 
visual rays do not fall. 
 This entails phenomenal externalism. The phenomenal difference 
between your seeing a round thing and your seeing a square thing is not 
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an intrinsic difference in your head or soul. Indeed, your head might 
be exactly the same in both cases. The phenomenal difference is an 
extrinsic, relational difference in what shapes you are acquainted with 
out in the world via the ray; it is entirely ‘outside the head’. And it is this 
merely relational difference that causally explains your different beliefs 
and behaviour in the two cases. 
 Today we accept intromission theory: vision is a causal process leading 
via light  from the object to the  brain . This might encourage acceptance of 
phenomenal internalism (see the ‘simple empirical argument’ below). 
But contemporary naive realists (e.g., Fish 2009, 137) combine it with 
naive realism. Their idea is that the long causal process going from 
external states to appropriate neural processing is the  supervenience base 
of the mind’s ‘reaching out’ and getting directly acquainted with those 
external states. 
 This view is also externalist, entailing that  intrinsic duplicates can differ 
phenomenally . To see this, consider again Harold on Earth where the 
sky is blue and Twin Harold on Inverted Earth where the sky is yellow 
(Section 2). Their neural processes as they view the sky are intrinsically 
identical. Nevertheless, on naive realism, they enable Harold and Twin 
Harold to be acquainted with different external concrete colour states 
(‘tropes’) involving the sky, because they are appropriately caused by 
those different external colours. 
 Traditional sense datum theory is another relational theory of phenom-
enology. Indeed, I argue that if it is generally considered a paradigmatic 
version of phenomenal internalism,  it is another version of  phenomenal 
externalism . 
 By ‘the sense datum theory’ I mean the view that phenomenal prop-
erties are grounded in an acquaintance relation to a concrete state 
involving a sense datum  wholly distinct from the subject , where a  sense 
datum is an object generally having the properties external things appear 
to have. On a standard elaboration, there are contingent psychophysical 
laws whereby the subject’s brain states cause certain sense data to come 
into existence for a short period of time and simultaneously cause the 
subject to stand in the acquaintance relation to those sense data. 
 I suspect many take sense datum theory to be internalist because they 
mistakenly think sense data are  parts of subjects (souls or brains), so that 
differences in sense data would indeed be intrinsic differences. This is 
not the view I have in mind. When in hallucination you are acquainted 
with a literally round sense datum, that round thing is of course not  part 
of your brain. And if you are a simple soul without any parts rather than 
a brain, then again the sense datum is not part of you. Then where are 
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sense data? On one version, sense data occupy a separate, private two-
dimensional mental space. Even on this version they are  wholly distinct 
from the subject (soul or brain) that observes them. On the different 
version defended by Price (1954, vii–viii) and Jackson (1977, 102), they 
are  three-dimensional objects in public physical space alongside physical 
objects. Think of them as projections of the brain. On this view, even 
though a sense datum exists in  public space , only the subject of the brain 
that causes it to come into existence there can be acquainted with it. So 
the sense datum theory is a relational theory like naive realism, with 
sense data as simulacra for physical objects. 
 Since sense data are wholly distinct from subjects, this theory is also 
externalist. Suppose as before that Harold has an ‘intrinsic duplicate’, 
Twin Harold, on inverted earth. Exactly what that means depends on 
the correct ontology of the human subject. If Harold and Twin Harold 
are physical things like brains or bodies (even if they bear  non-physical 
acquaintance relations to non-physical sense data), then they are 
intrinsic duplicates in that these brains or bodies share all of their 
intrinsic properties. Alternatively, if they are simple, non-physical souls, 
they are intrinsic duplicates because these souls have exactly the same 
intrinsic properties, like  being happy or  thinking . 
 Either way,  just like naive realism and tracking  intentionalism , the sense 
datum theory implies that  Harold and  Twin  Harold can differ phenom-
enally , contrary to phenomenal internalism. For suppose that Harold 
and Twin Harold live under different (‘inverted’) psychophysical laws 
connecting brain states with acquaintance with sense data, so that while 
Harold is acquainted with a blue sense datum on looking at the sky, Twin 
Harold is acquainted with a yellow one. Alternatively, suppose that they 
live under the same psychophysical laws but these laws are  probabilistic , 
so that even though Harold and Twin Harold undergo an intrinsically 
identical brain state, this same brain state happens to cause them to be 
acquainted with these qualitatively different sense data. 
 Then although Harold and Twin Harold are  intrinsic duplicates , they 
differ phenomenally. On the sense datum theory, just as on naive realism 
and tracking intentionalism, the phenomenal difference between these 
two brains or souls is  not an intrinsic difference. Instead, it is a purely 
 relational, extrinsic difference : they bear the acquaintance relation to 
different sense data wholly distinct from them. It is like the difference 
between sitting next to Mary and sitting next to Jane. Indeed, the  whole 
point of the sense datum theory is that phenomenal differences are rela-
tional differences, contrary to rival ‘non-relational’ views such as ‘adver-
bialism’. On the sense datum theory, this purely relational difference 
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between Harold and Twin Harold results in their having different 
perceptual and introspective beliefs and perhaps different behavioural 
dispositions. Hence, the sense datum theory is a version of phenom-
enal externalism no less than tracking intentionalism and naive realism. 
Experience isn’t fixed by how you intrinsically are; it’s fixed by your rela-
tions to things distinct from you. 
 Or again, suppose you have an experience of a tomato and consider 
a soul or a brain – call it BIV – that is an intrinsic duplicate of you in 
a vat. If phenomenal internalism is ‘intuitive bedrock’ (Hawthorne) or 
‘self-evident’ (Horgan and Tienson), then BIV must have the very same 
experience. Sense datum theorists disagree. To see this, suppose that 
for some reason this brain cannot produce sense data according to the 
usual psychophysical laws. H. H. Price noted in a famous passage (1954, 
3) that, on the sense datum theory, having a tomato-like experience 
(even in hallucination) essentially requires  accompaniment : it requires 
‘that there exists a red patch of a round and somewhat bulgy shape’ 
distinct from oneself and that this patch is present to one’s conscious-
ness. Price said  this is ‘self-evident’. If this is right, then BIV simply 
cannot have a  tomato-like experience, because BIV is unaccompanied 
by a suitable sensible object. So no less than naive realism and tracking 
intentionalism, sense datum theory is externalist, entailing that an 
intrinsic BIV duplicate of a conscious subject might fail to be a phenom-
enal duplicate. Against internalism, awareness of sense data is a rela-
tional affair that doesn’t supervene on a subject’s intrinsic state with 
‘metaphysical’ necessity (contingent psychophysical laws secure only 
‘nomic’ supervenience). 
 Now for my main point. If phenomenal internalism were really self-
evident or intuitive bedrock, we should be able to immediately rule out 
the basic relational conception of visual phenomenology (including 
extromission theory, naive realism and sense datum theory)  simply 
because it is externalist . But we cannot. For instance, pre-theoretically, it 
is simply  not counterintuitive that different visual experiences should 
be grounded in a purely extrinsic, relational difference involving what 
the subjects are acquainted with. So the argument from the internalist 
intuition against contemporary reductive externalist theories (e.g., 
tracking intentionalism and active externalism) is a non-starter. If we 
cannot rule out relational theories  just because  they violate phenomenal 
 internalism , we also cannot rule out reductive externalist theories for 
this reason. 
 So my criticism of the argument from the internalist intuition is that 
pre-theoretical reflection fails to support for phenomenal internalism. 
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 Although my criticism does not require it, I also believe something 
stronger: given what experience is like, pre-theoretical reflection supports 
 rejecting phenomenal internalism and  accepting phenomenal externalism 
(even though ultimately I accept internalism). The armchair enthusiasts 
have it backwards. 
 True, maybe  having a headache seems like an intrinsic, non-relational 
property of oneself. It was such sensations that motivated ‘adver-
bialism’. (Lycan [2001, 28] notes that even reductive externalists 
might accommodate the intuition that  some phenomenal properties 
involving one’s own body, like  having a headache , are indeed intrinsic.) 
But suppose you look at a tomato and have visual phenomenal prop-
erty  R on a particular occasion. Bracket all of your detailed empirical 
knowledge about the role of the brain, the possibility of hallucination, 
the case for materialism and so on. What theory would you accept if 
you had only phenomenology to go on? Intuitively, the basic  rela-
tional theory about  R is correct. Intuitively, there exists a red and round 
object  wholly distinct from you , and your having the phenomenal prop-
erty  R is grounded in your bearing an acquaintance relation to the 
concrete state of this object’s being red and round rather than any 
intrinsic property. The character of your conscious state is grounded 
in the object’s possessing these perceptible properties, together with 
the fact that you stand in a relation of acquaintance or direct aware-
ness to this state. 
 Likewise, if you see a balloon changing shape while deflating, it is not 
 pre-theoretically plausible that the phenomenal change in your experi-
ence is an  intrinsic change inside of you (even if empirical investiga-
tion has shown it is  accompanied by one), as the phenomenal internalists 
insist. Rather, what is  pre-theoretically plausible is that it consists in your 
being acquainted with the concrete instantiation of a new shape by an 
object distinct from you (akin to the difference between sitting next to 
Mary and sitting next to Jane). 
 Indeed, scores of philosophers (sense datum theorists and naive real-
ists) share the same basic relationality intuition for visual experience (Fish 
2009, 20). And as we have seen, the relational theory entails phenom-
enal externalism, because intrinsic duplicates, occupying different envi-
ronments or operating under different psychophysical laws, could be 
acquainted with different (mental or physical) items. 
 The armchair enthusiasts might offer a response to my more modest 
point that armchair reflection at least  fails to support phenomenal inter-
nalism. Hawthorne (2004, 352) and Horgan, Tienson and Graham 
(2004, 302) emphasize that the internalist conviction is ‘compelling’, 
The Real Trouble with Armchair Arguments 167
‘widespread’ and ‘persistent’. Maybe the best explanation is that we do 
in fact have some pre-theoretical justification for accepting phenomenal 
internalism in general, contrary to what I have suggested. 
 But this response fails. First, are most ordinary people  really inclined 
to accept phenomenal internalism? This is an empirical question – a 
question for ‘experimental philosophy’ – but I doubt it. As I have just 
said, throughout history many have been inclined to instead accept 
externalist naive realism. And recent studies (Winer et al. 2002) suggest 
that even today many accept the primitive  extromission theory of vision , 
which (as we saw) entails phenomenal externalism. 
 Second, maybe some other people, including philosophers and scien-
tists, are inclined to accept phenomenal internalism. But the reason 
cannot be that it is pre-theoretically self-evident or intuitive bedrock; I 
have shown it is not. I offer an alternative explanation: the  real source 
of their internalist conviction is not pre-theoretical reflection but what I 
will call the  simple empirical argument , which has a long history (Russell 
1927, 320ff.). Here’s a recent statement:
 It is only inner states that matter for experience [phenomenal inter-
nalism], not anything relational. [Phenomenal externalism] flies in 
the face of the scientific evidence correlating experiences with neural 
responses: for every measurable change in experience, there is some 
measurable change in the nervous system. (Prinz 2012, 19) 
 Likewise, Kriegel declares that ‘everything we know about the laws of 
neurophysiology suggest that a lifelong envatted brain with the same 
sensory-stimulation history of my brain would undergo the same expe-
riential life as mine’ (2011, 137). And Horgan and Tienson note that 
‘distal environmental causes generate experiential effects only by gener-
ating more immediate [neural] links in the causal chains between them-
selves and experience’. The simple empirical argument concludes that 
it is  metaphysically impossible to make changes in experience except by 
making changes in intrinsic neural properties. 
 So in view of what our experience of the world is like, what is 
 pre-theoretically plausible, before we learn any science, are externalist 
theories, such as naive realism: at least for visual experience, phenom-
enal differences  do not necessarily require intrinsic differences inside 
the head. Granted, today many philosophers (Kriegel, Horgan, Tienson, 
Hawthorne) vehemently reject phenomenal externalism and find 
phenomenal internalism ‘obvious’ across the board. But the explanation, 
I conjecture, is that they have for most of their lives known the basic 
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scientific facts about the role of the brain in enabling conscious experi-
ence. Because of the seductive simple empirical argument, they have 
become totally convinced of phenomenal internalism: phenomenal 
differences do require intrinsic differences inside the head. Because their 
confident belief in phenomenal internalism has become so ingrained, 
they mistakenly take it to be something that is obvious or self-evident 
on a moment’s reflection. But really it is just a high-level empirical belief, 
one that became widely accepted in the history of human thought only 
after detailed empirical investigation. 
 Now the phenomenal internalist might naturally respond, ‘OK, 
the armchair argument from the internalist  intuition fails, but why 
can’t I just directly rely on  the simple empirical argument to undermine 
reductive externalist theories like tracking intentionalism and naive 
realism?’ 
 My focus here is on armchair arguments, but let me address this ques-
tion. I favour certain empirical arguments (see Section 8), but I think 
that this very simple empirical argument fails. The quick way to see this 
is to note that it is equally true that ‘for every change in  thoughts about 
natural kinds , there is a measurable change in the brain’ (to appropriate 
Prinz’s language). But this does not entail that natural kind thoughts are 
fixed by intrinsic neutral properties: content externalism means this is 
not the case. The inference is equally fallacious concerning phenomenal 
states. 11 
 The fallacy is obvious: the mere fact that it is  nomically necessary 
in actual humans that phenomenal differences are correlated with 
intrinsic neural differences doesn’t mean that this is  metaphysically 
necessary . What Kriegel calls ‘the laws of neurophysiology’ might 
(like typical special science laws) obtain only relative to a background 
condition, one not satisfied in the case of the BIV. (For instance, a 
brain state might result in an experience of round  only if it normally 
tracks round objects.) Indeed, Prinz is wrong that the simple correla-
tional data even  raise the probability of phenomenal internalism over 
phenomenal externalism, since all phenomenal changes are correlated 
with  both changes in intrinsic neural states  and changes in externally-
determined content (e.g., when you go from seeing yellow to seeing 
blue, you go from a neural state that normally tracks yellow objects to 
a neural state that normally tracks blue objects). So the simple correla-
tional data alone are entirely neutral between phenomenal internalism 
and phenomenal externalism (naive realism, tracking intentionalism, 
active externalism). 
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 4  The argument from possibility intuitions 
 So the argument from the internalist intuition fails. But perhaps all is 
not lost for the armchair enthusiasts. Another argument is available: 
 the argument from possibility intuitions . The argument specifically targets 
 reductive materialist externalist theories, like tracking intentionalism. (It 
doesn’t work against  dualist externalist theories; see note 13.) Chalmers, 
Loar, Shoemaker and Levine suggest the argument but do not clearly 
distinguish it from the argument from the internalist intuition. 12 So let 
me explain the difference. 
 Again, consider tracking intentionalism. On tracking intentionalism, 
having  R entails the obtaining  of a certain wide ( non-intrinsic) physical 
condition : having a state that under biologically normal conditions 
tracks – and thereby represents – the instantiation of redness (on this 
view, a reflectance property) and roundness in the external world. 
Having the experience in the absence of the wide physical condition is 
metaphysically impossible. 
 Therefore, to refute such a reductive externalist theory, it would be 
enough to establish from the armchair the mere  possibility of having  R in 
the absence of the relevant wide physical condition. For instance, it would 
be enough to show that in  some possible world a BIV intrinsic duplicate of 
oneself has  R . It would also be enough to show that certain  spectrum inver-
sion scenarios are possible (more on this below). The argument from possi-
bility intuitions merely relies on such possibility claims. Thus it differs 
from the argument from the internalist intuition, which by contrast relies 
on a much stronger  necessitation claim to the effect that  every possible 
intrinsic duplicate of oneself (e.g., every possible brain in a vat duplicate) 
in  every possible world is a phenomenal duplicate of oneself. 13 
 For example: 
 The intuition [that a BIV with experiences is  possible ] supports the 
view that my [experiences] are constituted independently of my 
actual situation in the world. (Loar 2003, 230) 
 Focusing on ... color, I say ‘ THIS is supposed to be a reflectance prop-
erty of the surface of ... a cloud of fundamental particles’ ... . Reflection 
on the disparity between the manifest and the scientific image makes 
inescapable the conclusion that the phenomenal character we are 
confronted with in color experience is due not simply to what there 
is in our environment ... it seems intelligible [possible] that there are 
creatures who, in any given objective situation, are confronted with a 
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very different phenomenal character than we would be in that same 
situation. (Shoemaker 1994, 293–294) 
 It seems intuitively plausible that states with different qualitative 
character could nevertheless represent [track] the very same distal 
feature. (Levine 1997, 109) 
 On tracking intentionalism, having  R consists in being in a state that 
normally tracks the colour red, which is identical with a certain surface 
reflectance  F . But, Shoemaker notes, there is an  explanatory gap . Why 
should tracking this reflectance  F constitute a reddish experience as 
opposed to (say) a greenish experience? Therefore, against tracking 
intentionalism, it is intuitively possible that two individuals should 
normally track  F and yet be spectrum inverted: while one has a reddish 
experience, the other has (say) a greenish experience. So tracking inten-
tionalism is false. 
 In general, intuitively, phenomenology is modally independent of 
wide physical conditions, contrary to reductive externalism. 
 5  Problem: the argument is unavailable to materialists 
 My objection to the argument from the ‘internalist intuition’ was simply 
that we lack  pre-theoretical justification for accepting phenomenal inter-
nalism. By contrast, I grant that, contrary to reductive externalist theories, 
it  is intuitive that technicolor phenomenology is modally independent 
of wide  physical conditions, such as  tracking a particular reflectance prop-
erty (as opposed to wide  non-physical conditions, such as standing in a 
primitive acquaintance relation to a primitive external colour). This is 
just an instance of our more general antimaterialist intuitions. So the 
relevant scenarios are  conceivable . They cannot be ruled out a priori. 
 So what’s wrong with the argument from possibility intuitions? Tye’s 
response is that conceivability does not  entail possibility. 14 But this is 
not a strong criticism, because conceivability nevertheless provides  some 
defeasible evidence for possibility, hence against reductive externalist 
(e.g., tracking) theories. 
 I think that the real problem is that most philosophers are  materi-
alists , including Loar, Shoemaker and Levine. And materialists cannot 
consistently invoke possibility intuitions against reductive externalist 
theories. 
 There are only two possible forms of materialism:  internalist  materi-
alism (type-type identity theory, internalist functionalism) and  externalist 
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 materialism (tracking intentionalism, active externalism). Our possibility 
intuitions count equally against  both , since we have general  antimateri-
alist intuitions to the effect that experience is modally independent of  all 
physical conditions (internal and external). Call this the  parity problem . 
 To illustrate, consider Shoemaker. Shoemaker notes the explana-
tory gap between tracking a reflectance  F and having a reddish expe-
rience. The connection looks  contingent . So it is intuitively possible 
that tracking the reflectance  F could be associated with having a 
greenish experience rather than a reddish experience, as in spectrum 
inversion. 
 But it is strange that Shoemaker uses this argument against the 
externalist materialism of Dretske and Tye. Equally robust possibility 
intuitions would undermine Shoemaker’s  own  internalist  materialism . 
For on Shoemaker’s internalist materialism, having a reddish experi-
ence is constituted by some neural-functional state  N involving soggy 
grey matter. And the explanatory gap between having  N and having a 
reddish experience is  just as wide as the explanatory gap between tracking 
reflectance  F and having a reddish experience. The connection between 
neural-functional state  N and the colour experience seems  just as contin-
gent as the connection between reflectance  F and the colour experience. 
Consequently, contrary to Shoemaker’s internalist materialism, it is intu-
itively possible that  N should be associated with a reddish experience in 
humans and with a greenish experience in another population: there 
intuitively could be  spectrum inversion among individuals with the same 
narrow  neural-functional states , just as there intuitively could be spectrum 
inversion among individuals with the same wide physical states of the 
form  normally tracking reflectance F . 
 Likewise, as Loar (quoted above) implies, intuitively, a bad-off BIV 
could have a reddish experience while not tracking reflectance  F , 
contrary to reductive externalist theories, such as tracking intention-
alism. But it is equally intuitively possible that an individual (say an 
alien or a robot) should have a reddish experience while lacking neural-
functional property  N , contrary to the internalist materialism Loar 
himself accepts. 
 Our possibility intuitions against externalist materialism are not any 
‘stronger than’ our possibility intuitions against internalist materi-
alism. So materialists like Loar, Shoemaker and Levine would need some 
other considerations or arguments (e.g., the empirical arguments to be 
mentioned in Section 8) in order to justify accepting our possibility intui-
tions against externalist materialism while ignoring our equally strong 
possibility intuitions against their own internalist materialist theories. 
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But then these other arguments would be doing all the justificatory 
work. 
 Materialists cannot use possibility intuitions against externalist mate-
rialism for another reason. I call it  the bad lot problem . Consider an 
analogy: if you believe that the weather man is wrong in his predic-
tions about  wind conditions half the time (these predictions form a ‘bad 
lot’), you should put hardly any stock in  any of his predictions about 
wind conditions. But the materialist believes that our antimaterialist 
possibility intuitions about the relationship between the phenomenal 
and the physical also form a ‘bad lot’: whatever version of materialism 
turns out to be true, intuitions in this group must generally be false (e.g., 
if internalist materialism is true, all contrary possibility intuitions are 
false). So  if you accept materialism, you must say that not only do they 
provide equal justification against internalist materialism and exter-
nalist materialism (the parity problem); they are also not to be trusted at 
all (the bad lot problem). 
 6  The argument from phenomenal localism 
 Previously, I criticized the argument from the internalist intuition 
against reductive externalist theories of consciousness (Section 3). For 
instance, it is simply not pre-theoretically intuitive that tomato-like 
experience  R is  intrinsic . But, I concede, it  is pre-theoretically intui-
tive that your having  R for a period is  temporally local : that is, totally 
modally independent of everything outside  the total state of the universe 
during that period . Thus it differs, for instance, from the property of  being 
a traffic signal that means stop , whose instantiation now constitutively 
depends on past conventions (e.g., to stop when the light turns red). 
More generally, 
 Phenomenal localism : Necessarily for any phenomenal property  P , if a 
subject instantiates  P for temporal period  p , and proposition  C speci-
fies  all of the intrinsic properties and relations instantiated in  the 
whole  world during period  p , then, for any world  W at which  C is true 
for period  p , the subject also has phenomenal property  P in  W during 
period  p , no matter what  W is like before and after period  p . 
 Roughly, whereas phenomenal internalism is the claim that having a 
certain experience for a time supervenes on the intrinsic properties of 
the  subject alone during that time, phenomenal localism is the weaker 
claim that it at least supervenes on the intrinsic properties and relations 
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instantiated in  the whole universe during that time. To appreciate the 
difference, consider naive realism. On this view, the character of your 
experience is fixed by your standing in a primitive acquaintance relation 
to a state of the external world, so phenomenal internalism is false. But 
the holding of that relation at a time might be modally independent of 
the past and future (ignoring the time-lag argument), so that phenom-
enal localism is true. Likewise, on the sense datum theory, phenomenal 
internalism is false (as we saw), but phenomenal localism is true. 
 Phenomenal localism provides a promising argument against a  subset 
of reductive externalist theories; namely,  historical externalist theories 
that violate phenomenal localism. 
 Consider the tracking intentionalism of Dretske and Tye. Suppose you 
have reddish experience  R for ten seconds. And suppose tracking inten-
tionalism is true. On tracking intentionalism, you have  R because you 
have a brain state,  B , which has the  biological function of tracking the red 
reflectance. 
 Now consider a world  W that is intrinsically like the actual world for 
the ten-second period but in which everything came into existence ex 
nihilo at the start of the ten-second period (there is no past at all). In this 
world, since you have no evolutionary history, your brain state does not 
have the  biological function of tracking the red reflectance. So according 
to Dretske and Tye, in  W , even though the total state of the universe for 
the ten-second period is intrinsically same as in the actual world, you 
don’t have  R for that period, because your brain state represents nothing 
at all. 
 Or consider a world  Z in which only our evolutionary history is 
different in such a way that your current brain state  B now counts as 
having the function of tracking the  green reflectance . (Compare: had only 
the past been appropriately different, the stoplight turning red in the 
present might have meant  go rather than  stop .) On tracking intention-
alism, in  Z , even though the total state of the universe for the ten-second 
period might be intrinsically the same, you have a greenish experience 
rather than a reddish one for that period. 
 Scores of philosophers, appealing to BIVs and swampmen, argue that 
such externalist theories are absurd because they violate  phenomenal 
 internalism . We have seen that this standard argument fails: phenomenal 
internalism is simply not a self-evident truth.  Many perfectly coherent 
theories – extromission theory, naive realism and sense datum theory – 
violate phenomenal internalism. So I think philosophers shouldn’t have 
focused on phenomenal internalism. Instead they should have focused 
on  phenomenal localism . What is truly new and unusual about some 
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contemporary externalist theories is not that they violate phenom-
enal internalism but that they also violate phenomenal localism. Some 
past theories of phenomenal consciousness (sense datum theory, naive 
realism) violated phenomenal internalism but none violated phenom-
enal localism. 
 7  Problems with the argument from 
phenomenal localism 
 Nevertheless, I think that even the argument from phenomenal localism 
fails. 
 First, it undermines only a subset of reductive externalist theories: 
namely, those violating phenomenal localism, for instance the tracking 
intentionalism of Dretske and Tye. Other reductive externalist theo-
ries might accommodate phenomenal localism, even if they violate 
phenomenal internalism. 
 Here are some examples. (i) While Dretske’s and Tye’s versions of 
tracking intentionalism violate phenomenal localism because they 
appeal to history, maybe other possible versions accommodate phenom-
enal localism. True, devising such a theory might be difficult – since all 
standard theories of representation appeal to historical facts or forward-
looking facts to help settle what external features our inner states have 
the ‘biological function’ of tracking or track under ‘optimal conditions’ 
in the present – but maybe not impossible. (ii) Likewise, maybe naive 
realists could reduce the acquaintance relation to a complex mind-world 
causal relation. And maybe, contrary to Humeanism about causation, 
causal facts themselves are  local facts that do not depend on regularities 
in the past and future (Hawthorne 2004). The result would be a reduc-
tive externalism that accommodates phenomenal locality. (iii) Maybe 
‘active externalism’ and other output-based versions of phenomenal 
externalism can accommodate phenomenal localism, if the relevant 
action-oriented facts do not depend on the past or future. 
 Historical externalists like Dretske and Tye might pursue a less concili-
atory response: phenomenal localism is simply false, even if compelling. 
To soften the blow, they might say the following. 
 First, we also have locality intuitions about  x causes y and  thinking 
about water . But Hume and Putnam have convinced many that these 
intuitions are false. This bad track record might undercut  somewhat our 
confidence in phenomenal localism. 
 Second, materialists need a theory of how we might be justified a 
priori in believing that a property is local and a theory of how such 
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beliefs might be generally reliable. But that is hard to come by. (A mate-
rialist cannot comfortably accept ‘revelation’: that we ‘immediately 
grasp’ the full essential nature of phenomenal properties just by being 
acquainted with them and can tell that those essential natures don’t 
involve the past or future.) Absent such a theory, maybe we should be 
sceptical about our intuition favouring phenomenal localism. 
 Third, Tye and Dretske might explain away our localist ‘intuition’ as 
follows: since we do not have to look to the past or future to know 
that we have certain phenomenal properties now – one need only intro-
spect – we might erroneously conclude that they are temporally local. 
To see that this inference is erroneous, consider another case: my three-
year-old daughter can immediately tell just by looking that something 
is a heart, without knowing about its evolutionary history. But  being 
a heart is a historical, non-local property: if an intrinsic duplicate of 
the heart formed by chance in a swamp, it would not also be a heart, 
because it would lack the right evolutionary history – it would be a ‘fake 
heart’. The general point: you can know something without knowing 
all its a posteriori consequences. Likewise, maybe on Dretske and Tye’s 
historical externalism my daughter (or an adult sceptical of evolution) 
can immediately know about her phenomenal properties, even if she 
doesn’t know about her evolutionary history. 
 8  Conclusion: a plea for an empirical approach 
 Many prominent philosophers (Chalmers, Hawthorne, Horgan, 
Shoemaker) rely on armchair arguments against reductive externalist 
theories of experience (e.g., tracking intentionalism, naive realism, 
active externalism). 
 My aim has been to identify the ‘real problems’ with central armchair 
arguments, because I think the criticisms of Dretske, Lycan, Tye and 
others fall short. There are additional antiexternalist armchair argu-
ments I have not examined: for instance, the argument from the locality 
of mental causation (Fodor), the argument from introspection (Levine) 
and the argument from slow switching (Chalmers). But there are plau-
sible replies. 15 Indeed, although I have not shown this here, I believe 
that some (non-reductive) externalist theories (notably naive realism 
and sense datum theory) cannot be clearly ruled out on the basis of  any 
a priori arguments (Pautz 2010a). Here I have suggested to the contrary 
that armchair reflection on phenomenology  supports externalism. 
 Nevertheless, my own sympathies lie with phenomenal internalism 
and the ‘phenomenal intentionality program’ mentioned in the 
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introduction. In particular, elsewhere (2006) I have defended an inter-
nalist, neo-Galilean ‘projectivist’ version of intentionalism. Chalmers 
(2006) also defends such a theory, calling it the  Edenic Theory . My disa-
greement with armchair internalists like Chalmers is just this: I think 
that the only good arguments for internalism and against an externalist 
rival like naive realism are  empirical . 16 Elsewhere I have developed three 
empirical arguments: the  internal-dependence argument , the  structure 
argument , and the  explanatory argument . 17 (They differ from the faulty 
 simple empirical argument of Prinz, Kriegel, and Horgan and Tienson that 
I briefly criticized in Section 3.) To decide the important externalism-
internalism issue, we must get out of our armchairs and look seriously at 
work in neuroscience and psychophysics. 18 
 Notes 
 1 .  For reductive externalism, see Dretske (1995), Lycan (2001), Tye (2000), Noë 
(2004) and Fish (2009, 153). I will not explain ‘reductive’ here. See Sider 
(2011, 116–132) for clarification and defence of a general reductionism about 
the manifest image. See §2 of this chapter for a case for reduction over alter-
natives (e.g., basic grounding relations). 
 2 .  See Kriegel (2011), Horgan and Tienson (2002), Loar (2003) and Mendelovici 
(2010). Pautz (2013) defends in detail the following ‘consciousness-first’ 
picture: Consciousness grounds rationality because it is implicated in basic 
epistemic norms. (For a related view, see Smithies, Ch. 6 of this volume.) 
In turn, the facts about rationality help to constitutively determine belief 
and desire (Davidson, Lewis). So consciousness also ultimately grounds belief 
and desire. Chalmers (2012, 467) briefly defends a related two-stage view on 
which acquaintance grounds normative inferential connections and these in 
turn pin down content. 
 3 .  Another well-known argument for phenomenal externalism starts with what 
I have elsewhere (2007, 251) called the  properties version of the ‘transparency 
observation’ (see, e.g., Tye [forthcoming b]). But I think this ‘transparency 
observation’ (unlike the ‘spatial datum’) is far from pre-theoretically obvious, 
due to problems (not considered by Tye) concerning hallucination, many-
property situations and a priori constraints on attentive awareness (Pautz 
2007, 517, 522 and n. 12). 
 4 .  See, e.g., Kriegel (2011, 167) and Prinz (2012, 286). 
 5 .  The bad-off BIV has no visual receptor system or motor output system (just 
the central nervous system). Granted, if the BIV  were suitably connected to 
a human body, its current neural state  would track round things and cause 
round-appropriate behavioural movements. Could the BIV’s standing in this 
counterfactual relation to roundness constitute its standing in the phenom-
enal representation relation to  being round rather than to any other shape 
(e.g.,  being square )? No, for by  differently hooking up the BIV to the world 
and a motor output-system, we could get its brain state to be caused by (say) 
 square things and to cause  square -appropriate behaviour. 
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 6 .  However Johnston (2004), Pautz (2007) and Tye (forthcoming) provide an 
argument (not addressed by Kriegel or Mendelovici) for this claim, based 
on the fact that having  R would necessarily enable one to know what such 
properties or qualities are like (which requires that they exist and that one is 
perceptually related to them). 
 7 .  In a recent book (2012), Prinz presents his ‘AIR’ theory, a materialist theory 
of consciousness. The AIR theory entails that experiences are essentially  inter-
mediate representations , defined as  representations of  ‘view-point relative  micro-
features’ (see 124–126, 286; but see 327 for a contradictory claim). He also 
defends internalism: a BIV might have  R (19, 286). He might say (20) that 
in having  R the BIV phenomenally represents a response-dependent ‘shape 
appearance’ – a view I haven’t covered here. Could he avoid my argument 
that internalism leads to primitivism about representation relations? No; 
indeed, even though his AIR theory entails that experience is inseparable 
from sensory representation, he provides no theory of sensory representation 
in the book. This is like  Hamlet without the prince. Formerly, Prinz accepted 
Dretske’s externalist theory of representation (see Pautz 2010c). But as we 
have seen, Dretske’s  externalist theory cannot be applied to the BIV, since its 
internal states don’t have the biological function of indicating  any proper-
ties (including Prinz’s ‘microfeatures’ and ‘appearances’). Elsewhere (2010c) I 
also argue that Dretske’s theory is  incompatible with Prinz’s general view that 
experience represents ‘response-dependent properties’. 
 8 .  Horgan and co-workers actually invoke internalist theses somewhat 
different from the one I have formulated in the text. But I think they can 
be set aside because they are problematic. (i) Horgan, Tienson and Graham 
(2004, 302) say that, intuitively,  ‘ a [arbitrary]  physical duplicate of oneself 
would also be a phenomenal duplicate of oneself’; similarly, Kriegel (2009, 
79) claims that, intuitively, a  physical duplicate of me ‘would  have to undergo 
the same conscious experience I undergo’ (my italics). Unlike the more basic 
thesis of phenomenal internalism I formulated in the text (which is neutral 
on whether experience depends on intrinsic  physical or  non-physical nature), 
the thesis these philosophers are expressing is that mere intrinsic  physical 
duplication would have to result in phenomenal duplication. But intuition 
clearly  doesn’t support this. In fact, the reverse is true: intuitively, an intrinsic 
physical duplicate of you (e.g., a BIV) might be  spectrum inverted with respect 
to you, or a  zombie without any experiences at all (e.g., if dualism is true and 
the psychophysical laws are highly contingent). (ii) Horgan and co-authors 
suggest that what they call  narrowness is obvious: ‘phenomenology does not 
depend constitutively on factors outside the brain’ (2002, 526–527; 2004, 
299, 301). The problem with this  brain-based narrowness thesis is that it is also 
too strong to be justified from the armchair. It rules out  substance dualism and 
 sense datum theory , for on these views conscious experience depends consti-
tutively on the existence and character of particulars  wholly distinct from the 
 brain (neither non-physical souls nor non-physical sense data reside in the 
brain). It also rules out the ancient view that the physical basis of conscious-
ness is the  heart . Even if these views are false, mere intuition isn’t enough to 
rule them out. (iii) Horgan and Tienson (2002, n. 23) also suggest that what 
they call  intrinsicness is ‘self-evident to reflective introspection’: ‘phenome-
nology is not constitutively dependent on anything outside phenomenology 
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itself’. What does this mean? If ‘anything outside phenomenology’ means 
 anything ‘whose nature is describable in  non-phenomenological  language’ , in the 
words of Horgan and Tienson (2002, n. 23), then this thesis simply amounts 
to  dualism , so it doesn’t capture any obvious intrinsicality thesis. If, on the 
other hand, ‘anything outside phenomenology’ means  anything that  phenom-
enology does not constitutively depend on , then the thesis becomes a trivial 
analytic truth and so is even compatible with reductive externalist theories. 
 9 .  Chalmers (2006, 56), Hawthorne (2004), Kriegel (2007, 321) and Levine 
(2001, 113) explicitly claim that we have strong pre-theoretical reason to 
accept phenomenal internalism (but see Chalmers 2006, 78, for the opposite 
claim). Block (1990, 16) and Burge (2003, 444) accept phenomenal inter-
nalism without argument. 
 10 .  For these versions of the ‘inverted earth’ case, see Lycan (2001, 30–31) and 
Levine (2001, 113). 
 11 .  Tye (forthcoming a, §3) makes a similar point. 
 12 .  See Chalmers (2004, 168; 2006, 56) and the quotes below. 
 13 .  Here is another way to see that possibility intuitions differ from the inter-
nalist intuition. Consider the dualistic sense datum theory. Or consider 
a (somewhat strange) dualist version of naive realism, on which external 
qualities and our acquaintance with them supervenes only  nomically on the 
physical character of objects and the causal process from objects to the brain. 
Since they are externalist, such theories are inconsistent with the  internalist 
intuition . But since they are also dualistic, they are quite consistent with intu-
itions concerning the possibility of spectrum inversion and brains in vats: 
they agree that acquaintance with qualities – and hence phenomenology – 
can vary independently of wide  physical conditions. 
 14 .  See Tye (forthcoming a, §3) and (2000, 110). 
 15 .  For these arguments, see Fodor (1991), Levine (2001, 117) and Chalmers 
(2004, 354–355). For replies to Fodor’s causal argument, see Dretske (1995, 
151ff.) and Tye (forthcoming a, §3). For a reply to Chalmers’s argument 
from slow switching and indeterminacy, see Lycan (2001). As for Levine’s 
introspective argument, I think it too fails. Suppose you have the confident 
introspective belief that two of your colour experiences radically differ (for 
short, the ‘difference belief’). Levine argues that if an externalist theory like 
tracking intentionalism is true (or even if you merely  believe it is true), then 
your apparently indefeasible difference belief is in fact  defeasible by (perhaps 
misleading) empirical evidence that the colour experiences track the  same 
external reflectance feature: this evidence should make you reject your own 
confident introspective belief! My reply: this is an issue for  everyone (Byrne 
2003, 645). For instance, if neural identity theory is true (or even if you 
merely  believe it), then the ‘difference’ belief should likewise be defeasible by 
(perhaps misleading) evidence that your underlying  brain states are the same. 
Levine (117) also supposes that tracking intentionalism absurdly entails that 
you could confidently have the difference belief, even while it is  actually 
false, because the colour experiences  actually track the same feature. But this 
too is an issue for everyone: why cannot there be a radical mismatch between 
one’s  most basic, simple introspective beliefs and the true character of one’s 
experience (constituted by tracking, brain states, or whatever)? Pautz (2010c, 
359) sketches an answer (one available to externalists). 
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 16 .  This bears on modal epistemology. Chalmers’s (2009) two-dimensional 
approach and ‘modal rationalism’ require that all necessities (formulated 
in non–Twin Earthable terms) are a priori. But I think a counterexample 
is the necessary falsehood of certain relational-externalist theories, specifi-
cally  sense datum theory and  naive realism . True, Chalmers (2004, 168; 2006, 
56) thinks some  materialist externalist theories can be ruled out a priori on 
the basis of antimaterialist conceivability arguments about spectrum inver-
sion and the like. But Chalmers cannot use these a priori antimaterialist 
arguments against  non-materialist (dualist or ‘pansychist’) externalist theo-
ries, such as a non-materialist version of naive realism (see n. 13); indeed 
Chalmers considers such theories a priori  plausible (2006, 79). Against 
‘modal rationalism’, the necessary falsehood of such theories is only know-
able a posteriori (n. 17). 
 17 .  The internal-dependence argument and the structure argument are discussed 
in Pautz (2006, 2010c). The explanatory argument is briefly put forward in 
Pautz (2010c, n. 23). In more recent work, I use these empirical arguments 
against naive realism. 
 18 .  My thanks to Angela Mendelovici, Boyd Millar, Declan Smithies and Mark 
Sprevak. 
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